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THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE: 
PROVIDING A PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO IMPROVE WORKER 
SAFETY 
Most of the American work force is employed "at will," and is 
therefore subject to discharge at the discretion of employers. 1 Although 
many state courts have recognized exceptions to this common-law rule, 2 
employees continue to be arbitrarily discharged. 3 Thus, the at-will 
doctrine still provides the employer with a powerful source of coercion 
over its employees. 4 
The employment-at-will rule yields particularly harsh results when 
employees are required to work under unsafe conditions. Such employees 
must choose between risking their health and losing their jobs should 
they refuse an assigned task. Congress has provided some legislative 
protection for employees working under unsafe conditions; 5 these 
efforts, however, have failed adequately to protect many workers and 
the incidence of injury and death in the workplace remains high. 6 
Occupational safety would be greatly enhanced if employees had a 
viable option of refusing to work under unsafe conditions without 
risking their jobs. This Note proposes a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine that would give a cause of action to an 
employee discharged for refusing to work under unsafe conditions. Part 
l. See, e.g., Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Daniel v. Magma 
Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 
621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). One commentator has estimated that at least 600Jo of 
the American work force is employed at will. See Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: 
A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979). For an excellent discussion 
of the employment-at-will doctrine and proposed alternatives see THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
ISSUE, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23 (Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as BNA REPORT). 
See also COMM. ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Un-
just Dismissal, 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170 (1981) [hereinafter cited as At-Will Employment]. 
2. These exceptions are based on several theories. See irifra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562,409 A.2d 5~1 (1979) (upholding discharge allegedly 
motivated by bad faith, malice, and retaliation). 
4. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967). 
5. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 
see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (protecting 
concerted activity aimed, inter alia, at eliminating workplace hazards). 
6. In 1978, there were approximately 5.66 million injuries and illnesses and 4590 deaths in 
the private employment sector. I EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1 3106 (1980). 
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I examines the employment-at-will rule and its recognized exceptions. 
Part II analyzes the inadequacies of existing statutory remedies for a 
discharged employee who refused to work under unsafe conditions. 
Finally, Part III proposes an alternative remedy: providing a common-
law exception to the employment-at-will rule that will give an employee 
the right to refuse work under unsafe conditions without risking his 
job. This Note concludes that such an exception is essential to protect 
the health and safety of American workers. 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
At least sixty percent of the American work force is employed at 
will, and is consequently subject to discharge at the employer's 
discretion. 1 Discharge may be "for good cause, for no cause or even 
for cause morally wrong. " 8 This employment-at-will rule has recently 
been criticized severely by commentators. 9 Courts have also questioned 
7. See Peck, supra note I, at 8-10. Professor Peck estimates that between 600Jo and 650Jo 
of the nonagricultural work force is employed under contracts of employment that are terminable 
at will. This estimate is based on information derived from the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1977 (98th ed.). See also 
At-Will Employment, supra note I, at 170 & n. I (discussing workers covered by at-will rule). 
This estimate is reached by excluding from the number of nonagricultural employees those workers 
who are covered by collective bargaining contracts and those employed by federal, state, and 
local governments. Federal civil service employees are protected against "adverse action" by 
federal law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1978 & Supp. IV 1980). More than half of state and local 
government employees have some type of civil-service protection. Peck, supra note I, at 9. Ap-
proximately 900Jo of collective bargaining agreements require that there be "cause" or "just cause" 
for a discharge or that the discharge be for a specific offense. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTS. (BNA) 40:1 (1978). 
8. Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). Employees have been 
discharged for many reasons, including serving on a grand jury, Bender Ship Repair v. Stevens, 
379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); threatening to bring a malpractice action against an employer, Daniel 
v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); and living with 
another employee outside of wedlock, Ward v. Frito-Lay, 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980). In all of these cases the court upheld the employer's right to discharge 
the employee. 
These decisions are the result of a common-law doctrine first developed in the late nineteenth 
century when laissez-faire was the dominant economic theory. The employment-at-will doctrine 
was first enunciated in H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT§ 134 (1877). 
For a discussion of the historical development of the at-will rule see Murg & Scharman, Employ-
ment At Will: Do the Exceptions Ovi.rwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 332-40 (1982). 
9. Commentators have advocated a wide variety of solutions to the at-will problem. See, 
e.g., Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment 
At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980) (advocating use of contract principles to protect at-will 
employees); Blades, supra note 4, at 1421-27 (arguing for judicial recognition of a tort remedy 
for abusively discharged employees); Peck, supra note I, at 46-49 (favoring either court-imposed 
due process requirements for employee discharges or, preferably, a broad legislative solution 
requiring state agencies to review discharges to find if employers had just cause); Summers, In-
dividual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) 
(advocating enactment of a statute making arbitration of discharge cases available to all employees); 
Individual Rights in the Workplace: The At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 200 (1983). 
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the doctrine's usefulness and have mitigated its harsher effects by 
resorting to a variety of judicial interpretations. 
Most of these decisions recognize certain exceptions to the 
employment-at-will rule based on public policy considerations. 10 The 
first decision to make such an inroad on the general rule was Petermann 
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 11 In Petermann, the 
California Court of Appeal held that a discharge based on an employee's 
refusal to commit perjury was "patently contrary to the public 
welfare." 12 The court based its decision on the state's public policy 
embodied in statutes making perjury and its solicitation criminal acts. 13 
Since Petermann, courts in a number of states have recognized 
public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine based 
on various statutory policies. 14 Before a court will recognize a public 
policy exception, though, there generally· must be an explicit legislative 
statement of that policy. 1 5 It is usually not sufficient if th'e claimed 
exception is based on general statutory language 16 or codes of 
10. Twenty states have recognized public policy exceptions to the at-will rule. See BNA 
REPORT, supra note I, at 8, 33-65. A few courts have also relied on contract and tort principles 
in the absence of a clear statutory expression of public policy. Id. For example, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that a "just cause" provision in an employee handbook can create an im-
plied contract term even if the employee had not read the provision. Toussaint v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has also implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment 
contract. In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), 
the employer breached this covenant by terminating the plaintiff on the eve of his entitlement 
to substantial commissions. Another case involved an employee discharged for refusing to date 
her supervisor. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Although 
Monge did not involve a violation of statutory public policy or an implied contract, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court found that the employer's acts created a tort cause of action. Id. 
at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. 
II. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
12. Id. at 186, 344 P.2d 27. 
13. Id. 
14. Courts have not allowed employers to discharge employees for applying for union member-
ship, Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961), 
filing worker's compensation claims, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 
N.E.2d 425 (1973), refusing to falsify pollution control reports, Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo 
& Ironton R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), requesting jury duty, Nees v. 
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), and seeking employer compliance with federal and 
state consumer credit and protection laws, Harless v. First Nat'! Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 
1978). 
15. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (holding 
that there is no action for wrongful discharge unless a clear mandate of public policy has been 
violated); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 52 Ill. Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 
876 (1981) (stating that the employer retains the right to fire workers at will in the absence of 
clearly mandated public policy); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 184, 319 A.2d 
174, 180 (1974) (noting that California courts have limited the creation of exceptions to cases 
where there has been an explicit declaration of public policy by the legislature). But see note 
10 supra (listing cases where public policy exceptions have been recognized in the absence of 
a clear statutory expression). 
16. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) 
(upholding discharge of nurse who complied with general statutory nursing standards). 
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ethics. 11 No court has yet recognized a public policy exception to pro-
tect workers from dismissal in situations involving a threat to safety. 18 
Therefore, except where specific statutory provisions apply, the common-
law rule permits employers to discharge at-will employees who refuse 
to work under unsafe conditions. 19 
II. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS FOR UNSAFE CONDITIONS 
Although courts have not adopted a public policy exception for refusal 
to work in unsafe conditions, there are statutes that may benefit 
employees in particular circumstances. These include the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 20 and the National Labor Relations Act. 21 
• A. The Occupational Safety And Health Act 
In 1970, Congress approved the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
("OSH Act")22 to reduce the number and severity of work-related in-
juries and illnesses. 23 The OSH Act permits the Secretary of Labor 
to promulgate safety standards for employers engaged in interstate com-
merce. It also provides that all employers must provide a safe workplace 
"free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm .... " 25 
Section 1 l(c) of the OSH Act provides that no person can discharge 
or discriminate against any employee for exercising any right afforded 
17. See, e.g., Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696-97, 316 
N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (refusing to recognize public policy exception based on Code of Ethics 
of Internal Auditors). But see Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72,417 A.2d 
505, 512 (1980) (stating that, in some circumstances, a professional code of ethics may express 
public policy). 
18. Courts have recognized that an employer has a common law duty to provide a reasonably 
safe workplace. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. Courts have not held, however, that 
an employee may not be discharged for refusing to work under conditions where the employer 
has breached its duty. 
19. "The common law left the worker free to resign, but unable to remain at work and 
insist on safe conditions." Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, VanSchaick & Sheehy, Injunc-
tions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions, 64 CAL L. 
REV. 702, 711 (1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen]. 
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Some employees may also claim protec-
tion under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976), but such protection 
is quite restricted. See infra note 48. 
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
23. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 5177; H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
25. Id. § 654(a)(l) (1976). Congress's stated purpose in enacting the OSH Act was "to assure 
as far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working con-
ditions and to preserve our human resources .... " 29 U.S.C. § 65l(b) (1976). 
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by the Act. 26 The Secretary of Labor has issued a complementary regula-
tion stating that an employee may only refuse to perform work if he 
will be exposed to a "real danger of death or serious injury" and "there 
is insufficient time . . . to eliminate the danger through resort to regular 
statutory enforcement channels. " 21 In addition, the Supreme Court has 
held that complaining employees must have a reasonable, good faith 
belief that the regulation's conditions are met. 28 An employer can defeat 
such a claim by showing that there were other, legitimate reasons for 
the dismissal; the employee must show that the dismissal would not 
have taken place "but for" his actions pursuant to the regulations. 29 
The OSH Act therefore does not create an unfettered right to refuse 
work under potentially unsafe conditions. 30 
Even if an employee can refuse work under the OSH Act, however, 
section 1 l(c) does not furnish an effective enforcement mechanism to 
complement this right. An employee must file a complaint with the 
Secretary of Labor within thirty days of the alleged violation31 or lose 
his cause of action. 32 Even if the employee files a timely complaint, 
though, the decision whether to prosecute is left to the Secretary's 
discretion. 33 Most courts addressing the issue have held that an employee 
has no right to bring suit under the OSH Act. 34 The Secretary, however, 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(l) (1976). 
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1982). This regulation was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 22 (1980). 
28. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 21 (1980). One commentator has noted that 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Region II has installed a 24-hour hotline 
for emergency calls relating to safety conditions. By implication, this means that employees in 
this region are never without "resort to regular statutory enforcement channels." See Kirschner, 
Workers in a Whirlpool: Employee's Statutory Rights to Refuse Hazardous Work, 31 LAB. L.J. 
283, 291 n.48 (1980). 
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (1982). In one case, the court denied the employees relief although 
it recognized that there was a good faith dispute as to whether the conditions were unsafe. The 
employees failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were discharged for engaging 
in protected activity rather than for causing disruptions over the allegedly unsafe conditions. 
Marshall v. Klug & Smith Co., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 123,469 (D.N.D. 1979). See also Usery 
v. Granite-Groves, 1977-1978 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 122,126 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding predominant 
motive for discharge was substandard job performance rather than employees filing complaints 
alleging safety violations). 
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(l) (1982). 
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(d) (1982). 
32. In one case, although the employee filed a complaint with the Wyoming Occupational 
Safety and Health Department within the 30-day period, the court dismissed the case because 
he failed to file directly with the Secretary as statutorily required. The Secretary actually received 
the complaint some 53 days after the incident. Usery v. Certified Welding Corp., 1978 O.S.H. 
Dec. (CCH) 122,605 (D.Wyo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., 1979 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 23,257 (10th Cir. 1978). 
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976). An employee whose request for relief is denied by the 
Secretary can seek a writ of mandamus, but it will be granted only if the Secretary acted ar-
bitrarily or capriciously. See 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976). 
34. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that there is no private cause of action for a 
discharge under section l l(c). See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding 
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has neither the resources nor the personnel to handle all the complaints 
filed pursuant to section 11 (c). 35 Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor 
will not always adequately represent employee interests, as he must 
weigh the impact of his decisions on employers before pursuing a case. 36 
Given these qualifications and shortcomings, section 1 l(c) of the OSH 
Act does not adequately protect employees faced with the dilemma 
of whether to work under unsafe conditions. 37 
B. The National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 38 ensures workers the 
right to engage in concerted activity for the benefit of their "mutual 
aid or protection." 39 Employees, whether or not they are organized, 
may strike for health or safety reasons under the NLRA. 40 The 
reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activity 
is irrelevant when they are discharged for activity otherwise protected 
by the Act. 41 
suit can be brought only by the Secretary of Labor); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. 
Supp. 670, 671 (E.D.La. 1973), aff'd, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding no legislative inten-
tion to create private cause of action). See also Marshall v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review, 635 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that Secretary of Labor is the exclusive pro-
secutor of OSH Act violation). While declining to rule on the question whether or not a private 
cause of action exists, the Second Circuit has held that if there is such a right it is contingent 
on exhaustion of all other administrative remedies. McCarthy v. Bark Peking, 676 F.2d 42 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
35. In Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 1980), the Secretary of Labor 
filed an amicus brief urging the Court of Appeals, unsuccessfully, to recognize a private cause 
of action under section I l(c). See Comment, Retaliatory Discrimination Actions Under Section 
ll(c) of OSHA: Too Many Rights, Not Enough Protection, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 909,928 ("[A]s 
the scope of protected employee and prohibited employer activity continues to expand, the 
Secretary's workload may become so unreasonable that section I l(c) will not be adequately 
enforced."). 
36. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 705-06 (arguing that the Secretary is not ex-
clusively concerned with the safety of the individual worker but must also consider the impact 
of his actions on labor-management relations in general). 
37. In comparing the standard under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's 
("OSHA") regulation to that under the criminal necessity defense, one commentator has said 
the regulation is actually "overprotecting the interests of employers and underprotecting the in-
terests of workers." Frank, A Question of Equity: Worker's Right to Refuse Under OSHA Com-
pared to the Criminal Necessity Defense, 31 LAB. L.J. 617,623 (1980). See also Kirschner, supra 
note 28, at 294 (characterizing the regulation as a narrow provision unlikely to have a substantial 
effect in the workplace). See generally Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 715-17 (criticizing the imple· 
mentation of OSH Act policy by OSHA on several grounds, including understaffing, underfunding, 
rare issuance of citations for serious violations, and ease with which industry may obtain 
modifications). 
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
40. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (holding seven unorganized 
employees could not be discharged for leaving work without permission where shop was intolerably 
cold). 
41. See id. at 16 (citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938)) 
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The "concerted activity" requirement, however, presents problems 
for the lone employee who refuses to work under what he perceives 
as unsafe conditions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has held that efforts by an individual employee to enforce provisions 
of a collective bargaining agreement constitute concerted activity. 42 Other 
circuits, however, have explicitly rejected this reasoning and denied 
an individual's cause of action predicated on "concerted activity. " 43 
Even the Second Circuit has rejected the extension of protection to 
individual action taken outside of the context of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 44 Thus, it is unlikely that a single at-will employee who 
refuses to work under unsafe conditions could successfully claim that 
he was engaged in concerted activity. 
The NLRA has other statutory45 and administrative46 limitations that 
reduce its effectiveness. The Secretary of Labor has estimated that the 
NLRA covers forty-four million employees as compared with the OSH 
Act's sixty-four million. 47 Given this restricted coverage and the limited 
definitions of "concerted activity" in many circuits, the at-will employee 
(holding reasonableness of a worker's engaging in concerted activity is irrelevant in determining 
if a labor dispute existed or not); see also Modern Carpet Indus., 1978 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 
1 19,379, enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Modern Carpet Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 
1979) (reasonableness of employees' fear of unsafe conditions is not an element to be considered 
when employees are discharged for protected activity). 
42. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). This is so even in 
the absence of interest on the part of fellow employees in the effort. Id. at 500. 
43. See, e.g., Scooba Mfg. v. NLRB, 51 U.S.L.W. 2399 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 1982) (finding 
no concerted activity where there was no evidence that discharged employee acted on behalf 
of her co-workers); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969)) (action 
must be "intended to enlist the support and assistance of other employees. . . . "); 
ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that individual action "must 
be made on behalf of other employees or at least be made with the object of inducing or prepar-
ing for group action and have some arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreement."); 
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (individual action "must 
appear at the very least [to be) engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing 
for group action or [have] some relation to group action."). Other restrictions include the Sixth 
Circuit's requirement that the employer know that the employee's behavior was "concerted" 
before the employer can be found to have illegally discharged an employee who complained 
of hazardous conditions. Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 125-26 (6th Cir. 1980). 
44. Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the argument of 
the NLRB in Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 219 (1978)). But see Randolph Division, 
Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that unorganized employee's 
statements to management were "concerted activity"); Alleluia Cushion Co., 1975-1976 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) 1 16,451 (discussing implied consent of unorganized employees to individual worker's 
complaints concerning violations of occupational safety statute). 
45. The NLRA does not apply to agricultural workers, independent contractors, or super-
visors. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
46. The NLRB will not assert jurisdiction over businesses not meeting a minimum volume 
of business test (including about 22% of retail and service businesses). See LESLIE. CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 53 (1979). 
47. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 726 n.23 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 
I (1980). 
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who refuses to work under unsafe conditions is unlikely to find much 
protection under the NLRA. Most employees will be unwilling to risk 
their jobs by relying on this remedy, even when faced with a risk to 
their health. 48 
Ill. PROPOSAL: A PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO PROTECT 
EMPLOYEES WHO REFUSE TO WORK UNDER UNSAFE CONDITIONS 
A. Nature of the Exception 
Given the inadequacy of the existing statutory remedies, courts should 
recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule to 
protect an employee discharged for refusing to work under unsafe 
conditions. 49 Many courts already recognize exceptions to the at-will 
rule when the public policy is clear and specific. so In the area of worker 
safety, there is a clear public policy: courts have held that employers 
have an affirmative duty to provide a safe workplaces I and the OSH 
48. Another source of statutory relief available to organized employees is the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act ("LMRA"). 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976). This Act seeks to prescribe certain 
"legitimate rights" of employees and employers in their business relationships. The LMRA ex-
empts work stoppages related to "abnormally dangerous conditions" from no-strike clauses in 
collective bargaining agreements. Id. Pursuant to court decisions interpreting the LMRA, an 
honest belief by the employee that the conditions with which he is faced are "abnormally 
dangerous" is not enough. The Supreme Court has held that "objective evidence" must be presented 
on this question. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). See also, 
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 1961 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 9748, aff'd sub nom. Teamsters, Chauffeurs 
& Helpers Local Union No. 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that an objec-
tive test is to be employed). The limited protection offered by the LMRA has prompted scholarly 
criticism. See, e.g., Ferris, Resolving Safety Disputes: Work or Walk, 26 LAB. L.J. 695, 704 
(1975) ("reliance upon [the LMRA's) protection by employees is a very complicated and risky 
matter"). Because the LMRA applies only where there is a collective bargaining agreement, it 
is of no help to at-will employees. 
49. But see Scarzafava & Herrera, Workplace Safety - The Prophylactic and Compensatory 
Rights of the Employee, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 911 (1982). The authors argue that sufficient pro-
tection is afforded employees under the existing statutory remedies. However, they fail to ad-
dress the Secretary's admitted inability to handle all of the complaints received pursuant to the 
OSH Act. The authors do not consider the issue of the desirability of giving the employee a 
private cause of action. 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19; see also At-Will Employment, supra note 1, 
at 181 ("decisional developments suggest an emerging trend in favor of extension of protection 
to the unorganized employee in the private sector"). 
51. See, e.g., Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1879) (holding that an employer 
is obliged not to expose its employees to perils or hazards which may be guarded against by 
the employer's exercise of proper diligence); Smith v. Western Electric Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 2200 
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1982) (stating that employer must use all reasonable care to provide 
a reasonably safe workplace and protect employees from avoidable perils); Shimp v. New Jersey 
Bell Telephone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976) (holding that employer has "affirm-
ative duty" to provide a safe working environment). Prosser states that at common law an employer 
had a duty to provide its employees a safe place to work. The enforcement of this right was 
severely hampered by the employer's common-law defense of contributory negligence, assump-
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Act contains explicit statutory language embodying this duty. 52 This 
policy implies that workers should not have to choose between facing 
health and safety hazards and keeping their jobs. The best way to pro-
vide employee protection is to adopt a judicial exception to the at-will 
doctrine. 
Some courts are unwilling to apply such an exception because they 
believe Congress intended the OSH Act to be the exclusive remedy for 
workplace hazards. 53 Such a belief is mistaken. 54 Furthermore, the 
Secretary of Labor recognizes that the best way to achieve worker safety 
is to allow private causes of action against employers. 55 Given the clear 
statutory policy in favor of worker safety, courts should be willing 
to fashion a private cause of action for an employee threatened by 
an employment hazard. 
Courts are already familiar with the process of embellishing safety 
statutes for the benefit of employees. The Federal Employer's Liabil-
ity Act56 and the Jones Act57 provide for recovery by injured railroad 
tion of risk, and the fellow servant rule. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526-27 
(4th ed. 1971). 
52. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
53. Despite the obvious shortcomings with the protection afforded employees under section 
ll(c) of the OSH Act, the Oregon Supreme Court has come to the surprising conclusion that 
no additional protection for a wrongfully discharged employee is necessary. Walsh v. Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977). In Walsh, the plaintiff was discharged 
for complaining about safety conditions. Although he had filed a complaint pursuant to section 
l l(c), in addition to this common-law action for wrongful discharge, the record does not show 
the eventual disposition of that complaint. The Sixth Circuit, in criticizing the Oregon Court's 
reasoning, stated that "[t]he Oregon Supreme Court has held that although it would be willing 
to extend common-law protection to employees who complain about safety, there was no need 
to do so because of OSHA! We cannot abdicate our responsibilities under OSHA in the hope 
that state courts will extend needed protection to workers." Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 
F.2d 715, 726 n.23 (1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. l (1980). 
The Oregon Supreme Court subsequently has shown signs of rethinking its position. Brown 
v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). Brown granted a common-law cause 
of action to an employee discharged for filing a workmen's compensation claim despite the ex-
istence of an alternative, statutory remedy. The Court tried to distinguish Walsh because the 
statutory remedies in Brown were clearly inadequate. Id. at 613, 588 P.2d at 1095. The con-
tinued vitality of Walsh is doubtful, however, given the court's equivocal language: "We do 
not believe that our decision in this case is necessarily inconsistent with our decision in [Walsh]. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
54. The OSH Act cannot be construed "to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner 
the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any 
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course 
of, employment." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). "The statute reflects a desire 
to improve worker health and safety conditions without supplying the definitive program for 
achievement of that objective. Under these circumstances, the Act should not be construed to 
foreclose development of the state common law system." Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 725. 
55. According to the Secretary, "individual suits offer the only realistic hope of protecting 
employees from retaliatory discrimination." Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 263 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
56. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1976). 
57. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1976). 
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workers and merchant seamen. The Supreme Court has stated that in 
enacting these statutes, Congress "created only a framework within 
which the courts were left to evolve, much in the manner of the com-
mon law, a system of principles providing compensation for injuries 
to employees consistent with the changing realities of employ-
ment. . . . " 58 In the same way, the courts should allow recovery for 
employees discharged for taking actions to avoid being injured in the 
first place. 
Courts are also the most appropriate and most likely place for such 
protection to arise. 59 One significant reason for a judicially created 
rule is that there ~e numerous obstacles to any legislative effort. 
Legislatures rarely enact major reforms in the absence of strong pressure 
to do so. 60 Given the diversity of unorganized employees as a whole, 
they are unlikely to coalesce into an effective lobbying effort. 61 On 
the other hand, any legislative initiative is likely to face the combined 
opposition of management and organized labor. The former would 
seek to avoid restraints on their discretion; the latter would seek to 
prevent unorganized employees from receiving protection absent a 
union. 62 The inevitable institutional constraints of legislatures, such as 
the ·numerous committees which must review and propose legislation, 
also militate against legislative action. 63 
Creating a judicial exception to the at-will rule, however, avoids these 
problems by placing the burden of convincing the legislature to act 
on organized lobbies and pressure groups rather than on unorganized 
58. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 437 (1958). 
59. But see Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to Terminate At-Will Employees, 15 
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 633 (1982) (arguing that statutory standards, similar to those under 
the Civil Service Act, should be adopted to deal with wrongfully discharged at-will employees). 
The author criticizes the common-law approach because it relies on the gradual development 
of case law with the danger of inconsistent decisions or of outright rejection of the proposed 
remedy by some courts. Id. at 646-47. This reasoning fails to recognize that the courts will still 
engage in the inevitable case-by-case judicial interpretation of the meaning and appropriate ap-
plication of any such statute. Furthermore, state legislatures are as likely to be reluctant to adopt 
the proposed remedy as are some courts. Indeed, legislatures may well be less likely to accept 
the remedy. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text; see also Blades, supra note 4, at 1433-34 
(stating that employee protection will have to originate in the courts); Peck, The Role of the 
Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963) (maintaining 
that the realities of the legislative process hinder the tort law reform); Note, Protecting At Will 
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1816, 1837-39 (1980) (arguing that prospects for legislative action are doubtful). 
60. See generally D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1962). 
61. "[E)mployees having diverse job specialties and working at varying echelons of employ-
ment simply are not equipped to form a cohesive group with enough power to influence legislators." 
Blades, supra note 4, at 1434 (footnote omitted). 
62. See id.; Note, supra note 59, at 1838 (1980). 
63. One commentator has indicated that legislators "seldom give high priority to bills pro-
posing to modernize outmoded decisional rules of law." Keeton, Judicial Law Reform - A 
Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254, 1262 (1966). 
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at-will employees. 64 This "catalytic function" of the judiciary facilitates, 
rather than hinders, representational government. 65 
B. A Proposed Judicial Test 
In applying a public policy exception to the diverse set of employ-
ment conditions which will be encountered, courts will inevitably engage 
in a large amount of case-by-case development - the test will necessarily 
be affected by particular fact situations. Certain general guidelines can, 
however, be established. 
1. The standard of liability- Following the OSH Act standard 
establishing an employer's duty, employees should not be forced to 
work under conditions ''that are causing or are likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm, .... " 66 In decisions under the OSH Act, 
courts have allowed the factfinder to define "serious physical harm." 
One factor which courts often consider in making such a determina-
tion is whether the threatened injury would have required medical 
attention. 67 A more restrictive definition of serious physical harm is 
undesirable. The factfinder should evaluate all of the circumstances 
surrounding an employee's injury in arriving at a determination without 
any single factor being determinative. 68 In applying this standard, a 
good-faith, reasonable belief by the employee that the conditions are 
dangerous should be required to prevent numerous trivial complaints. 69 
2. Causation- The test for causation that is fairest to the employee 
is the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Mount Healthy City 
School District v. Doyle10 • It has subsequently been used by the Na-
64. See Peck, supra note 59, at 286. 
65. "Such a catalytic function of the judiciary, producing legislative consideration of society's 
needs on matters that no interested group would otherwise question, might well be categorized 
as an implementation of representative government." Id. Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 
339 U.S. 33 (1950). In Wong, the Supreme Court held that deportation proceedings of the Im-
migration Service were subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. According to the Court: 
"The agencies, unlike the aliens, have ready and persuasive access to the legislative ear and if 
error is made by including them, relief from Congress is a simple matter." Id. at 47. 
66. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1976). A cause of action under this proposed test should not be 
governed by the OSH Act's 30 day requirement, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; 
rather, the action should be subject to the applicable statute of limitations for tort actions. 
67. See Dorman Products, Inc., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 23,508. 
68. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 1980) (existence and defini-
tion of serious bodily injury under the Major Crimes Act were questions for the jury). 
69. Although the NLRA requires only a good-faith, not a reasonable, belief by the employee, 
this standard is essential to the particular character of that Act - to protect concerted activity 
- and is best left to actions under that Act. See generally NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 
304 U.S. 333 (1938) (finding that reasonableness of employee's position is irrelevant to essential 
question of whether a genuine labor dispute exists). 
70. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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tional Labor Relations Board in discriminatory discharge cases. 11 Under 
the Mt. Healthy test, the employee must make a prima facie showing 
that his engaging in protected conduct was a motivating factor in his 
employer's discharge decision. In this instance, the protected conduct 
would be a refusal to work under conditions threatening death or serious 
physical injury. The burden then shifts to the employer to show that 
the discharge would have occurred even in the absence of the employee's 
protected action. 72 
This test protects the legitimate interests of both parties while 
reasonably allocating the burden of proof. 73 The employee is freed from 
the onerous task of establishing what was in the employer's mind beyond 
the showing necessary to establish a prima facie case. The employer, 
who is in a much better position to furnish proof on the matter, is 
then provided a framework within which to establish its justifiable 
motives. 74 
3. Defenses- Once the employee has established a prima facie case, 
the employer can establish certain defenses. One such defense is that 
the discharge was for legitimate business reasons quite apart from the 
employee's refusal to work. Such legitimate reasons would include situa-
tions where the employee was, for example, continually unproductive 
or tardy. These situations could not, however, result from the existence 
of the unsafe working conditions and still constitute legitimate motives 
for the discharge. 
Another defense available to the employer would be that the worker 
had assumed the risk of the unsafe conditions. The factfinder should 
be instructed that employees assume the ·ordinary risks of their 
business. 75 Ordinary risks of the business are those risks that are in-
cidental to the business. 16 Thus, a construction worker should not be 
able to refuse to work at heights, while a schoolteacher may. 11 
71. See, e.g., Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 438, 1980 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,356. This test has been applied outside the labor context in a case in-
volving an equal protection claim. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977). 
72. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287-88 (1977). 
73. See generally Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 438, 1980 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,356. 
74. "[T]he shifting burden analysis set forth in Mt. Healthy and Arlington Heights represents 
a recognition of the practical reality that the employer is the party with the best access to proof 
of its motivation." Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 438, 1980 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,356. See also Garcia v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 689, 
263 P .2d 8 (1953) (stating that burden may be shifted to one who has information needed to 
establish a fact asserted by party-opponent). 
75. See Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213,217 (1879); Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 
353 Mo. 558, 566, 183 S.W.2d 140, 144 (1944). 
76. Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 566 183 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Mo. 1944). 
77. The particular condition involved, although of a kind generally encountered in the business, 
may be such an extreme example of that condition that it is an "out-of-the-ordinary" risk. For 
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4. Mitigation- If, upon the employee's refusal to work under un-
safe conditions, the employer offers comparable alternative employ-
ment that is safe, the employee should be expected to undertake such 
alternative employment. 78 In keeping with the general rule of mitiga-
tion of damages in an employment context, the employee would not 
have to accept alternative employment of a substantially different 
character. 19 If the employer can off er no alternative employment, 
however, the employee should not be penalized. 
5. Remedies- Courts should grant relief based on the general rules 
covering damages in tort actions. Thus, the employee should be com-
pensated for all injuries proximately resulting from his wrongful 
discharge. 80 This award will often consist of back pay. 81 Reinstatement 
will also generally be appropriate. 82 
6. Injunctive relief- As long as the employee has a right to keep 
his job while refusing to work under unsafe conditions there is no reason 
to give him any additional right to sue for an injunction against the 
continuance of the condition. The employee can still seek an abate-
ment of the condition under the existing administrative procedures 
without suffering any danger to his person in the meantime. 83 
7. Application of the Test- Under this proposed test, an at-will 
employee who is discharged for refusing to work under "unsafe con-
ditions" would be able to bring an action for unjust dismissal within 
the jurisdiction's statute of limitations for tort actions. The plaintiff-
employee would bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case that 
example, a construction worker could refuse to work at heights that were out of the ordinary 
even for the construction trade. 
78. See generally Comment, supra note 35, at 914-26 (distinguishing between employee who 
resigns voluntarily and one who is dismissed by tlie employer without an offer of alternative 
employment). 
79. See, e.g., Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n v. Kleen-O-Rama, 60 Mich. App. 
61, 64, 230 N.W.2d 308, 310 (1975) (holding that employee is under a duty to mitigate damages 
by accepting employment of a "like nature", considering the type of work, hours of labor, 
wages, tenure, etc.). 
80. See AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 11 (1965). 
81. Whether or not back pay is an appropriate remedy under section ll(c) of the OSH Act 
is a question left unresolved by the Supreme Court. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 
I, 19 n.31 (1980); see also Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that back pay is an appropriate remedy for a discriminatory discharge); Marshall v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1637, 1639 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (back pay ap-
propriate). But see Note, Imminent Danger in the Workplace: Does the Employee Have a Choice? 
- Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S.Ct. 883 (1980), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 654-55 (1981) 
(arguing that back pay is probably not allowable under section 1 l(c) even though this section 
allows nonequitable relief). 
82. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972); Phelps Dodge Corp. 
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). Of course, whether to accept reinstatement is up to the employee. 
For a different view of appropriate remedies in discharge cases, see Malin, Protecting the 
Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. L.J. REF. 277, 314 (1983). 
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (right of employee to request inspection 
by Secretary). 
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his refusal to undertake the unsafe assignment was a motivating factor 
in the discharge. The employer would then bear the burden of produc-
ing evidence showing that it would have ordered the discharge even 
in the absence of the employee's refusal. 
The employee would also bear the burden of proving that he had 
an objective, reasonable belief that the conditions were causing or were 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm. The employer may 
establish as an affirmative· defense that the conditions involved only 
the ordinary risks incidental to the business. Such conditions would 
normally qualify as "safe" within the meaning of the test. 
If the factfinder decides that the employee has met his burden of 
proof and that the employer has failed to establish any affirmative 
defenses, then it should find for the employee. Damages would nor-
mally consist of back pay although the employee might lose these if 
he had failed to mitigate damages by refusing proferred alternative 
employment substantially similar to the plaintiff's usual employment. 
Reinstatement would be appropriate if the employee wished to return 
to work that did not involve unsafe conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
At present, at-will employees can be dismissed by their employers 
for refusing to work under conditions that could cause death or serious 
physical injury. Existing statutory remedies on which at-will employees 
might rely are inadequate. The most viable alternative is a court-drawn 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that would 
protect employees faced with discharge for having refused to work under 
unsafe conditions. Such an exception would save many employees from 
the intolerable dilemma of having to choose between their safety and 
their livelihood. 
-Daniel T. Schib/ey 
~~ •. 
